Not topping my shortlist in https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/with_replies, but:
3. Make backups. Multiple, stored at different physical locations.
4. Be prepared for account lockout.

Not topping my shortlist in https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/with_replies, but:
3. Make backups. Multiple, stored at different physical locations.
4. Be prepared for account lockout.
@NanoRaptor : sorry, 4 (of many)
1. Check the websitename (domain name) and know how to interpret them (see screenshot, info in Alt text. Another hint: Punycode).
2. MitM (Man in the Middle) attacks are the worst.
3. Make backups. Multiple, stored at different physical locations.
4. Be prepared for account lockout.
@adfichter : I'm trying to warn people for such holes.
Published earlier this month: https://www.heise.de/en/news/BSI-and-ANSSI-warn-against-VideoIdent-for-the-EU-digital-wallet-10476045.html (there of course is a German version as well).
It refers to a recent joint publication (in English) by the German BSI and the French ANSSI titled:
"Remote ldentity Proofing for EUDI Wallet Onboarding: Strengthening Assurance Against Evolving Threats"
(EUDI Wallet = European Digital Identity Wallet aka EDIW aka EUDIW).
It's about the risks of VideoIdent (getting bigger every day, see e.g. https://www.theverge.com/report/714402/uk-age-verification-bypass-death-stranding-reddit-discord - not to mention AI).
However, like in their previous publication (PDF: https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/ANSSI-BSI-joint-releases/ANSSI-BSI_joint-release_2023.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3) they ignore one HUGE risk: AitM's (Attacker in the Middle).
The unmentioned gaping security hole here are fake websites, where people are being directed to via falsified emails, SMS, chat app messages and possibly QR-codes.
Step :
————
Victim (contacts AitM site as instructed)
|
| "Please give me my EDIW"
v
AitM site: contacts site below and forwards
|
| "Please give me my EDIW"
v
True EDIW identity verification site
Step :
————
Victim
^
| "Please perform VideoIdent"
|
AitM site: forwards
^
| "Please perform VideoIdent"
|
True EDIW identity verification site
Step :
————
Victim
|
| VideoIdent showing victim
v
AitM site: forwards
|
| VideoIdent showing victim
v
True EDIW identity verification site
Step :
————
Victim
^
| "Something went wrong"
|
AitM site: stores victim's EDIW on their device
^
| EDIW
|
True EDIW identity verification site
The same may happen to people who are tricked into *authenticating* using EDIW on AitM websites.
Hey @hetzner I just registered as customer and clicked a virtual server on your site. The whole process was seamless and unbelievably quick!
When setting up an OS image could you please display the #SSH server key in the Hetzner console? I couldn’t find it anywhere and https://www.reddit.com/r/hetzner/comments/tsvrir/how_to_verify_ssh_host_key_fingerprint_when/ reads like others have the same problem, too.
I try really hard not to skip host key checking and eventually booted Ubuntu Live ISO and read my SSH host key manually.
@VXShare @StarkRG @jay @vildis @vxunderground OFC, if their corporate firewall didn't blocklist your domain, most #MITM-based "#NetworkSecurity" solutions and "#EndpointProtection" will checksum files and instantly yeet them into the shadow realm.
And lets be honest: Like with chemistry and medicine, one wants to have a supplier that isn't shady af but actually transparent.
"If your reports don't feel safe, they won't tell you" — This is one of the clearest and most important pieces of advice I've heard for managers.
It's a perfect illustration of the "monster in the middle dilemma for navigating both social and organizational/authoritative power dynamics as a manager. Power dynamics are the monster in the middle — and if a manager doesn't actively work to mitigate that, they will fail to operate effectively as a manager.
It's not something anyone can fix or prevent, it's an inevitable, inescapable aspect of the management threat model.
#mitm
Public key cryptografie voor leken
Het is een beetje behelpen met "ASCII graphics", maar in https://www.security.nl/posting/884482/Public+keys+voor+leken probeer ik, ook aan minder digitaal vaardigen, uit te leggen hoe asymmetrische cryptografie werkt.
Doe er uw voordeel mee, want deze techniek is een belangrijk fundament van de steeds verder digtaliserende maatschappij.
U leert hoe een digitale handtekening werkt en wat een digitaal certificaat is.
Veel te weinig mensen begrijpen dat goed, en dat bemoeilijkt een fatsoenlijke discussie over deze technieken enorm.
Big tech is de lachende derde: zij maximaliseren hun winsten terwijl alle risico's voor uw rekening komen.
@Linux #ClownFlare is literally a #ValueRemoving #RentSeeker that #MITM's traffic to capture #Logins in #PlainText & also acts as #RogueISP hosting everything from #CSAM to #Cybercrime and #Terrorism.
"Franse overheid voert phishingtest uit op 2,5 miljoen leerlingen"
https://www.security.nl/posting/881630/Franse+overheid+voert+phishingtest+uit+op+2%2C5+miljoen+leerlingen
KRANKZINNIG!
Het is meestal onmogelijk om nepberichten (e-mail, SMS, ChatApp, social media en papieren post - zie plaatje) betrouwbaar van echte te kunnen onderscheiden.
Tegen phishing en vooral nepwebsites is echter prima iets te doen, zoals ik vandaag nogmaals beschreef in https://security.nl/posting/881655.
(Big Tech en luie websitebeheerders willen dat niet, dus is en blijft het een enorm gevecht).
@aral :
I don't want to pay a cent. Neither donate, nor via taxes.
@aral : most Let's Encrypt (and other Domain Validated) certificates are issued to junk- or plain criminal websites.
They're the ultimate manifestation of evil big tech.
They were introduced to encrypt the "last mile" because Internet Service Providers were replacing ads in webpages and, in the other direction, inserting fake clicks.
DV has destroyed the internet. People loose their ebank savings and companies get ransomwared; phishing is dead simple. EDIW/EUDIW will become an identity fraud disaster (because of AitM phishing atracks).
Even the name "Let's Encrypt" is wrong for a CSP: nobody needs a certificate to encrypt a connection. The primary purpose of a certificate is AUTHENTICATION (of the owner of the private key, in this case the website).
However, for human beings, just a domain name simply does not provide reliable identification information. It renders impersonation a peace of cake.
Decent online authentication is HARD. Get used to it instead of denying it.
REASONS/EXAMPLES
Troy Hunt fell in the DV trap: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/114222237036021070
Google (and Troy Hunt!) killed non-DV certs (for profit) because of the stripe.com PoC. Now Chrome does not give you any more info than what Google argumented: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/114224682101772569
https:⧸⧸cancel-google.com/captcha was live yesterday: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/114224264440704546
Stop phishing proposal: https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/113079966331873386
Lots of reasons why LE sucks:
https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/112914047006977222 (corrected link 09:20 UTC)
This website stopped registering junk .bond domain names, probably because there were too many every day (the last page I found): https://newly-registered-domains.abtdomain.com/2024-08-15-bond-newly-registered-domains-part-1/. However, this gang is still active, open the RELATIONS tab in https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/13.248.197.209/relations. You have to multiply the number of LE certs by approx. 5 because they also register subdomains and don't use wildcard certs. Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revolver-rabbit-gang-registers-500-000-domains-for-malware-campaigns/
@troyhunt : if we open a website that we've never visited before, we need browsers to show us all available details about that website, and warn us if such details are not available.
We also need better (readable) certificates identifying the responsible / accountable party for a website.
We have been lied to that anonymous DV certificates are a good idea *also* for websites we need to trust. It's a hoax.
Important: certificates never directly warrant the trustworthyness of a website. They're about authenticity, which includes knowing who the owner is and in which country they are located. This helps ensuring that you can sue them (or not, if in e.g. Russia) which *indirectly* makes better identifiable websites more reliable.
More info in https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/113079966331873386 (see also https://crt.sh/?Identity=mailchimp-sso.com).
Note: most people do not understand certificates, like @BjornW in https://mastodon.social/@BjornW/114064065891034415:
❝
@letsencrypt offers certificates to encrypt the traffic between a website & your browser.
❞
2x wrong.
A TLS v1.3 connection is encrypted before the website sends their certificate, which is used only for *authentication* of the website (using a digital signature over unguessable secret TLS connection parameters). A cert binds the domain name to a public key, and the website proves possession of the associated private key.
However, for people a domain name simply does not suffice for reliable identification. People need more info in the certificate and it should be shown to them when it changes.
Will you please help me get this topic seriously on the public agenda?
Edited 09:15 UTC to add: tap "Alt" in the images for details.
@cR0w @troyhunt @dangoodin @benjojo @Viss @matthew_d_green
Seriously, #ClownFlare are at best a #ValueRemoving #MITM and more often than not a #RogueISP who's business model is a #RacketeeringScheme that should not exist to begin with.
@0xF21D #ClownFlare is a #RogueISP and their #MITM-based approach eould've always allowed that.
@0xF21D wrote: "[...] something we technically knew was going on before but didn't consciously consider a threat, until now."
I've been warning for CDN's like Cloudflare and Fastly (and cloud providers in general) for a long time.
Here's a recent toot (in Dutch, the "translate" button should do the job): https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/114042082778156313.
If you trust Google to translate it (guaranteed NOT error-free, it *may* work in other browsers than Chrome): https://infosec-exchange.translate.goog/@ErikvanStraten/114042082778156313?_x_tr_sl=nl&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp
P.S. Fastly knows your https://infosec.exchange login credentials.
@torproject same with #obfs4 bridges: there is no option to say like ports=80,443
or similar, which makes it cumbersome to get said bridges.
And trying to get places to #DontBlockTor that criminalize the use of #Tor is foolish at best.
Isn't it poetic and ironic that out of all possible time lines we are in one where #securejoin #openpgp protocols on top of the existing #email protocols offer the arguably most solidly scaling, useable, world-wide federated end-to-end encrypted messaging reality, safe against compromised #mitm servers? Hundreds of billions spend to create "the email successor" and here we are in 2025 .... #interoperable #email and #cryptography as the tortoise looking at Achilles through the back mirror :)
The previews were visible. I was just wanting to open in new tab in order to read the text in the image(s).
I knew what it was about, so no big deal.
It was probably my favorite neighborhood MITM.
That would be the same one that you mentioned.
@TheDoctor512 @steampixel noice.
Idealerweise per #burp nen #MITM-#Proxy reinknallen und dessen Zertifikate in den Speicher des Smartphones/Tablets importieren?