OuttaTune — The Microsoft Intune Conditional Access bypass I reported is now officially closed by MSRC (again).
It began as “By Design”… then was reclassified as a Moderate severity vulnerability… led to a product group meeting… and ultimately forced Microsoft to revise their official Conditional Access guidance.
Yet now it’s closed - with no fix timeline, no CVE, and no researcher credit. 
Let’s unpack it. 
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The Issue
Intune lets you apply Conditional Access policies using device filters - say, “block access to Office 365 from DevBox VMs.”
But that device model? It’s just a registry key.
A local admin can change one line, sync the device, and suddenly it’s not a DevBox anymore. It’s “Compliant.” It’s trusted. It’s in.
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Microsoft’s Initial Response
“This is by design.”
“Assignment filters should be used sparingly.”
“Intune cannot accurately lock down a device if an admin on the machine is actively working against management.”
Wait - imagine Microsoft saying that about Defender for Endpoint:
“Sorry, if someone has admin, Defender just gives up.”
Of course they wouldn’t say that. Because security controls must assume hostile actors. Why should Intune be any different?
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The Outcome
• I pushed back, published my findings, and spoke directly with Microsoft’s product teams.
• They reclassified the issue as a Moderate security vulnerability.
• They changed official documentation to warn against using properties like device.model in isolation.
“Microsoft recommends using at least one system defined or admin configurable device property…”
That change exists because of this research.
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But the Case Is Now Closed
MSRC insists that:
“This requires admin and knowledge of policy filters, so it remains Moderate.”
But attackers don’t need to know your exact filters - they can just trial different registry values and sync until they’re in. No alerts. No resistance. No risk of detection unless you’ve layered in custom EDR rules.
And admin access is table stakes. We can’t keep pretending that post-exploitation scenarios don’t matter.
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Final Thoughts
Conditional Access isn’t just about who you are - it’s supposed to account for where and what you’re accessing from.
But when enforcement relies on unverified local data, the door isn’t locked. It’s not even shut.
We’ve just convinced ourselves that it is.
Trust nothing. Validate everything.
Even the registry keys your policies depend on.
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Blog link: https://cirriustech.co.uk/blog/outtatune-vulnerability